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INTRODUCTION 
It is hard to argue that Peter Cannon was done wrong. In 2006, while 
researching a brief in a bankruptcy matter, Cannon, a Des Moines, Iowa attorney, 
discovered an article on a New York law firm’s website.1 The article was composed 
by two of the firm’s bankruptcy lawyers, and it was apparently quite on point.2 
Cannon’s opening brief was nineteen pages long; he composed seventeen of those 
pages by cutting and pasting whole paragraphs from the online article.3 He did not, 
however, see fit to cite the article from which he extensively copied.4 
 
*Clinical Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. I thank 
professors Alyssa Dragnich, Kim Holst, Sue Chesler, Jason Cohen, Tamara Herrera, and John Kappes 
for taking the time to review early drafts of this article. Their guidance was invaluable, and this Article 
is surely better for their efforts. 
1. See generally In re Burghoff, 374 B.R. 681 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2007). Cannon’s client was not a 
debtor or creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding; rather, Cannon’s client was made a party defendant 
because the bankruptcy trustee suspected the client of fraudulently receiving pre-petition transfers from 
the debtor. Id. at 683. The trustee retained two attorneys to investigate the alleged fraudulent transfer; 
Cannon’s motion was intended to remove these counsel on asserted conflict of interest grounds. Id. 
The online article he copied from was titled Why Professionals Must Be Interested in ‘Disinterestedness’ 
Under the Bankruptcy Code; it was written by William Schram and Marc Haut, two attorneys with the 
firm of Morgan, Lewis and Bockius LLP. See id. 
2. See id. 
3. See id. 
4. See id. 
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If a plagiarist is someone who copies the written work of another without 
giving attribution to the original author,5 then Peter Cannon is certainly a plagiarist. 
But as plagiarists go, it seems he wasn’t terrible at the craft. Before drafting (i.e., 
copying) his brief, he obtained a command of the case record.6 He conducted 
research beyond the copied article.7 And, to better support his client’s argument, he 
made necessary editorial changes to his copied materials by deleting or altering 
certain passages.8 On the other hand, it is probably true that the key to being a truly 
skilled plagiarist is to escape detection. And Cannon did not escape detection. His 
brief was too good. The Bankruptcy Court became suspicious of the brief’s 
“unusually high quality”9 and ordered Cannon to certify the brief’s authors.10 The 
gig was up; Cannon came clean.11 
The judicial swords fell heavy. In a written opinion submitted for publication, 
the bankruptcy court described Cannon’s plagiarism as “a fundamental professional 
deficiency”12 and humiliated him with an order that he enroll in a law school ethics 
class.13 After a formal ethics investigation, the Iowa Supreme Court, again in a 
published opinion, ordered a public reprimand.14 To add insult to injury, the case 
garnered national attention. After the Bankruptcy Court’s published decision was 
issued, Peter Cannon was deemed “Lawyer for the Day” on the website Above the 
Law. The editors tagged the article under “attorney misconduct” and “rank 
stupidity.”15 
 
5. This is a standard dictionary definition of plagiarism, which I will rely upon throughout.  
See Plagiarize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/plagiarizing 
[https://perma.cc/8T8J-MBSZ] ( last visited January 25, 2019). This definition of plagiarism tracks that 
offered by the Modern Language Association: “Plagiarism is presenting another person’s ideas, 
information, expressions, or entire work as one’s own.” See Plagiarism and Academic Dishonesty, THE 
MLA STYLE CENTER, https://style.mla.org/plagiarism-and-academic-dishonesty [https://perma.cc/ 
845W-DDYB] ( last visited January 25, 2019). Moving beyond these standard definitions can  
be treacherous. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 11 (2007) (observing 
that plagiarism “turns out to be difficult to define”); Brian Frye, Plagiarism Is Not a Crime, 54  
DUQ. L. REV. 133, 141-42 (2016) (“The meaning of the term ‘plagiarism’ is indeterminate in part 
because it depends on social context. Different social groups define plagiarism differently by adopting 
various plagiarism norms.”). 
6. Cannon claimed to have reviewed thirty-two banker boxes of documents in preparation for 
drafting the brief. See Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cannon, 789 N.W.2d 756, 758 
(Iowa 2010). 
7. See id. 
8. See Burghoff, 374 B.R. at 683–84. 
9. Cannon, 789 N.W.2d at 757. 
10. Burghoff, 374 B.R. at 683. 
11. Cannon acknowledged that he had “relied heavily” on the article he found online. Id. He 
also self-reported himself to the Iowa Bar for discipline. See Cannon, 789 N.W.2d at 758. 
12. Burghoff, 374 B.R. at 687. 
13. Id. The Bankruptcy court explained that “a continuing education class will not cure his 
ethical shortcomings. Mr. Cannon’s deficiency calls for the more-involved method of instruction 
offered in a law school course on professional responsibility.” Id. 
14. Cannon, 789 N.W.2d at 760. 
15. See David Lat, Lawyer of the Day: Peter Cannon, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 10, 2007, 2:30 PM), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2007/09/lawyer-of-the-day-peter-cannon [https://perma.cc/A62M-VHEX]. 
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Fair enough. But why, exactly, would a court care about a failure of attribution 
in a brief, especially when the end product is of high quality? In its formal ethics 
opinion, the Iowa Supreme Court explained only that “misrepresentation” qualified 
as attorney misconduct under Iowa’s Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c) and that 
Cannon’s plagiarism was misrepresentation “plain and simple.”16 But that reasoning 
begs the question. It explains that Peter Cannon’s plagiarism warranted a sanction 
because he misrepresented he was the true author of the brief. In other words, his 
plagiarism warranted a sanction because, well, it was plagiarism. 
There is persistent body of case law in which courts publicly rebuke attorneys 
for plagiarism in a submitted brief.17 This case law suggests a robust rule  
against plagiarism in written advocacy. Courts variously label the practice  
as “unprofessional,”18 “obnoxious,”19 “dishonest,”20 “reprehensible,”21 “wholly 
intolerable,”22 and “completely unacceptable.”23 But like the Iowa Court in Cannon, 
these courts never explain why, exactly, plagiarism is worthy of sanction.  
 
16. Cannon, 789 N.W.2d at 759. See also IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 32:8.4(c) (2015) 
(defining “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” as attorney misconduct). 
17. What follows is a catalog of published cases. Presumably, many more courts have 
admonished attorneys for plagiarism in a filed brief by means more informal than a published “bench 
slap.” See Wayne Schiess, Ethical Legal Writing, 21 REV. LITIG. 527, 527 (2002) (“Many more lawyers 
have gotten into trouble for their writing, although they were fortunate enough not have their cases 
published.”); Venesevich v. Leonard, 378 F. App’x. 129 (3d Cir. 2010) (admonishing attorney for 
plagiarizing earlier court order); United States v. Bowen, 194 F. App’x 393, 402 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(admonishing attorney for plagiarizing case law and issuing warning “to all attorneys tempted to ‘cut 
and paste’ helpful analysis into their briefs”) (emphasis added); United States v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 1213, 
1219 n.2 (8th Cir. 1995) (expressing “disapproval of a style of brief-writing that appropriates both 
arguments and language without acknowledging their source”); Rossello v. Avon Prods., Inc., No. 14-
1815(JAG), 2015 WL 5693018, at *2 n.4 (D.P.R. Sept. 28, 2015) (labeling counsel’s plagiarism as 
“dishonest, unprofessional, and potentially sanctionable”); Pick v. City of Remsen, 298 F.R.D. 408, 412 
n.1 (N.D. Iowa 2014) (calling counsel’s plagiarism of earlier opinion of court “lazy, obnoxious, and 
unprofessional”); A.L. v. Chi. Pub. Sch. Dist. #299, No. 10 C 494, 2012 WL 3028337, at *6–67  
(N.D. Ill. July 24, 2012) (admonishing counsel and cutting fee reward on grounds of counsel “cutting 
and pasting” from case law without attribution); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Harris, No. 3:11-36-
DCR., 2012 WL 896253, at *1 n.3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 15, 2012) (admonishing counsel for plagiarizing from 
case law, calling the practice “completely unacceptable”); United States v. Sypher, No. 3:09-CR-00085, 
2011 WL 579156, at *3 n.4 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2011) (admonishing counsel for plagiarizing from 
Wikipedia); Schultz v. Wilson, No. 1:04-CV-1823, 2007 WL 4276696, at *6 n.13 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2007) 
(admonishing counsel for plagiarizing case law and explaining that “such conduct often ‘ill-represents 
the client’s interests’”); Vasquez v. City of Jersey City, No. 03-CV-5369 ( JLL), 2006 WL 1098171, at *8 
n.4 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006) (expressing “displeasure” with counsel for plagiarizing from case); 
Kingvision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. Wilson, 83 F. Supp. 2d 914, 916 n.4 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (labelling 
counsel’s plagiarizing of secondary source “distasteful” and likely misconduct under Tennessee Code 
of Professional Conduct); Premier Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Labor, No. 2011-SCC-0032-
CIV, 2012 WL 6589404, at *4 n.7 (N. Mar. I. Dec. 18, 2012) (calling attorney’s plagiarism of trial court 
order “unacceptable conduct” below the “highest standards of integrity and professionalism”). 
18. Vasquez, 2006 WL 1098171, at *8 n.4. 
19. Pick, 298 F.R.D. at 412 n.1. 
20. Rossello, 2015 WL 5693018, at *2 n.4. 
21. Pagan Velez v. Laboy Alvarado, 145 F. Supp. 2d 146, 160–61 (D.P.R. 2001). 
22. Dewilde v. Guy Gannett Publ’g Co., 797 F. Supp. 55, 56 n.1 (D. Me. 1992). 
23. United States v. Bowen, 194 F. App’x 393, 402 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006). 
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Rather, the courts proceed as though plagiarism is a malum se offense, a practice of 
such obvious moral turpitude that its prohibition requires no further explanation. 
Does plagiarism before the courts have a moral dimension? Your answer to 
that question may turn on how much time you have spent studying and working in 
an academic setting. One thing that all judges have in common is that they spent 
many years training in academic institutions, typically four years of college and 
another three years of law school. The academy, of course, has a strict rule against 
plagiarism in all written work product. As a scholar, to be labeled a plagiarizer is the 
“academic equivalent of the mark of Cain.”24 As a student, plagiarism is a cardinal 
offense, punishable by expulsion under even the barest student honor codes. In the 
classes I teach in law school, I instruct my students that plagiarism is professional 
doom: even if a plagiarist is not expelled from law school under the honor code,25 
bar examiners may still find her unfit to practice.26 Surely, if you spend enough time 
in an institution where plagiarism is likened to a biblical mark of shame, a rule 
against plagiarism will begin to feel like a moral imperative.27 
To be sure, the heavy rule against plagiarism that prevails in the academy 
makes good sense. But that’s not because plagiarism is a universal evil. The academic 
norm prevails because originality has a unique value in the academic setting, and 
these values are well served by a professional rule against plagiarism.28 There is a 
modest amount of scholarship examining broad plagiarism norms. A fundamental 
precept in all this scholarship is that rules against plagiarism do not rest on some 
universal philosophical notion; rather, all plagiarism norms are context-specific.29 
 
24. K.R. ST. ONGE, THE MELANCHOLY ANATOMY OF PLAGIARISM 61 (1988); see also POSNER, 
supra note 5, at 107 (observing that plagiarism in the academy is a “capital intellectual crime”). 
25. For cases where plagiarism by a law student resulted in expulsion, see Beauchene  
v. Mississippi College, 986 F. Supp. 2d 755 (S.D. Miss. 2013); Yu v. University of La Verne,  
126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 763, 766 (Ct. App. 2011); In re Lamberis, 443 N.E.2d 549, 552-53 (Ill. 1982). For  
a discussion of these and other plagiarism cases involving students in law schools,  
see Decarlous Y. Spearman, Citing Sources or Mitigating Plagiarism: Teaching Law Students the Proper 
Use of Authority Attribution in the Digital Age, 42 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 177, 182-83 (2014). For an 
interesting case of law student plagiarism that did not result in expulsion, consider the case of former 
Vice President Joseph Biden. In 1965, while a student at Syracuse Law School, Biden submitted a fifteen 
page paper for credit that copied, without attribution, five pages from a law review article.  
See E.J. Dione, Jr., Biden Admits Plagiarism in School but Says It Was Not “Malevolent,” N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 18, 1987, at A1. Biden received a failing grade in the class and the offense was documented in his 
law school record, but he was not expelled. See generally id. 
26. For cases where bar applicants were denied admission because of an act of plagiarism in law 
school, see In re White, 656 S.E.2d 527,528 (Ga. 2008); In re K.S.L., 495 S.E.2d 276, 277-78 (Ga. 1998); 
In re Zbiegen, 433 N.W.2d 871 (Minn. 1988); In re Widdison, 539 N.W.2d 671 (S.D. 1995). 
27. See Stuart Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on the 
Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 175 (2002) 
(“For most people within the relevant community, the attribution norm becomes internalized. Such 
people view attribution as being, or closely akin to being, a moral obligation . . . .”). 
28. See infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
29. ST. ONGE, supra note 24, at 62 (“The essence of the [plagiarism] complaint of unfair usage 
and deficient acknowledgement resides in the contextuals in which the offense or alleged offense 
occurs.”); Frye, supra note 5, at 147 (“The scope of the attribution right depends on the social group 
that creates and enforces the plagiarism norm.”); Green, supra note 27, at 196–97 (observing “a good 
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They are conceived and enforced to serve the discrete needs of the institution in 
which a potential plagiarist operates.30 
Once plagiarism is properly viewed as “a breach of disciplinary decorum, not 
a breach of the moral universe,”31 one must be wary of painting the professional 
norms of the academic setting into other realms.32 Indeed, while plagiarism might 
be a sin in the academy, in other professional settings, it can be a virtue. Consider 
transactional law practice, where attorneys are routinely called upon to draft 
contracts and like instruments. In transactional law practice, it is no dark secret that 
attorneys rarely draft original documents; rather, they plagiarize other attorneys’ 
work product.33 If an attorney likes the wording of a warranty clause in a contract 
drafted by an unaffiliated attorney, it is no sin to copy that clause verbatim into a 
new document without giving the original drafter attribution.34 In fact, most 
scholars argue that you should plagiarize other lawyers’ work in transactional 
practice: first, because uniformity in contract language creates interpretive 
efficiencies; and second, because plagiarizing another attorney’s work saves time 
and money.35 
 
deal of inconsistency in both the reaction plagiarism elicits and the manner in which it is treated within 
and across sub-communities”). 
30. See David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism (Without a Moral 
Right Against Reverse Passing off), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 69 (2004) (observing that a plagiarism 
definition “expresses the ‘house rules’ that certain guilds—notably academics, but other domains as 
well . . . —have accepted upon themselves. Those who cross the line risk not liability in court to the 
general public, but rather being defrocked from the particular priesthood which maintains its special 
rules.”); James Petersen & Jennifer Gregor, Attorneys at Work: A Flexible Notion of Plagiarism, LAW 
360, October 7, 2011, at *6 (“[W]hether an act of copying without attribution is characterized as 
plagiarism depends on the needs of the institution in which it occurs.”). 
31. Stanley Fish, Plagiarism Is Not a Big Moral Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2010. Fish further 
offered that plagiarism rules are “less like the rule against stealing, which is at least culturally universal, 
than it is like the rules of golf. . . . It’s an insider’s obsession.” Id. 
32. For an example of a court expressly applying the academic rule to written practice, see 
Dewilde v. Guy Gannett Publ’g Co., 797 F. Supp. 55, 56 n.1 (D. Me. 1992) (“Plagiarism is unacceptable 
in any grammar school, college, or law school and even in politics. It is wholly intolerable in the practice 
of law.”) (emphasis in original). 
33. See Carol Bast & Linda Samuels, Plagiarism and Legal Scholarship in the Age of Information 
Sharing: The Need for Intellectual Honesty, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 777, 803-04 (2008) (reviewing that 
“[p]racticing attorneys customarily borrow from the writing of others, especially for transactional 
documents; in fact, it is fairly rare for an attorney to produce wholly original writing.”); Marilyn 
Yarbrough, Do as I Say, Not as I Do: Mixed Messages for Law Students, 100 DICK. L. REV. 677, 678-
79 (1996) (“[I]t is conceded that the circulation and reuse of documents and the use of forms is an 
acknowledged and accepted practice within the legal community.”). 
34. See Fed. Intermediate Credit Bank v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 540 S.W.2d 14, 16 n.2 (Ky. 1976) (“Legal 
instruments are widely plagiarized, of course. We see no impropriety in one lawyer’s adopting another’s 
work, thus becoming the ‘drafter’ in the sense that he accepts responsibility for it.”). 
35. See TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW AND WHY LAWYERS DO WHAT THEY 
DO 335 (2d ed. 2014) (“Almost all [contract] drafting done today begins with a precedent for two 
reasons. First, it is efficient. Precedents save time and money. Rather than reinventing the wheel for 
each new deal, a lawyer gets a head start. Second, if the precedent is a good one, using it will reduce 
errors and improve a contract’s quality.”); Bast & Samuels, supra note 33, at 803–04 (2008) (reviewing 
that a rule against copying in contract drafting would be “needlessly time intensive and, therefore, 
expensive. It might also be counter-productive, as identical language among transactional documents is 
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This is all a long way of saying that plagiarism is not a malum se offense; courts 
and professional tribunals cannot sanction plagiarism in a brief relying on presumed 
morality. Rather, a rule proscribing plagiarism must be premised on specific and 
identifiable institutional needs. And this is where Cannon and other cases 
sanctioning attorneys for plagiarism disappoint—they never quite explain why, 
exactly, an anti-plagiarism rule is worth enforcing. That is not to say, of course, that 
there might not be compelling policy goals underlying the rule. But the judicial 
omission is telling. Once you take a presumed universal morality off the table, it can 
be vexingly difficult to make sense of a rule against plagiarism in written practice. 
Scholars that have tackled plagiarism in the round often remark that a coherent 
theory is surprisingly elusive.36 Indeed, plagiarism doctrine proves so unexpectedly 
complicated that you begin to wonder if it is worth the chase. And, perhaps, this 
explains the courts’ reluctance to go beyond conclusory explanations for their anti-
plagiarism rule: a fuller explanation just doesn’t seem worth the effort. After all, 
who is going to argue in favor of plagiarism?37 
I will give it a shot: simply put, plagiarism saves time and money. Provided 
plagiarized materials are properly contextualized and edited, the plagiarizing 
attorney can take less time to produce effective written advocacy.38 The existence 
 
more likely to be interpreted consistently.”); Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77 
CHI-KENT L. REV. 59, 63 (2001) (observing that copying form documents “enables the product to be 
produced by lower-paid, less-senior and less-experienced lawyers.”); Davida H. Issacs, The Highest Form 
of Flattery? Application of the Fair Use Defense Against Copyright Claims for Unauthorized Appropriation 
of Litigation Documents, 71 MO. L. REV. 391, 410 (2006) (observing that parties plagiarize contract 
language “precisely because of its accepted meaning, often established in case law. Using terms with 
accepted meanings helps parties ensure a mutual understanding and a ‘meeting of the minds’”). 
36. See THOMAS MALLON, STOLEN WORDS: FORAYS INTO THE ORIGINS AND RAVAGES OF 
PLAGIARISM xiii (1989) (describing scholarly thinking about plagiarism as “primitive” and finding 
“generalizations on [the] subject to be . . . perilously porous”); REBECCA MOORE HOWARD, STANDING 
IN THE SHADOW OF GIANTS: PLAGIARISM, AUTHORS, AND COLLABORATION xviii–xx (1999) (“Until 
very recently, scholarly discussions of plagiarism assumed it to be a natural (though loathsome) category, 
not a constructed one; hence, these discussions did not undertake causal and evaluative arguments 
about the construction of plagiarism and the cultural work that this construction performs.”); MARILYN 
RANDALL, PRAGMATIC PLAGIARISM: AUTHORSHIP, PROFIT, AND POWER vii (2001) (“Plagiarism is a 
slippery subject because, while almost everyone agrees on what it is, few agree on where it is to be 
found.”) (emphasis in original); Frye, supra note 5, at 152 (“While innumerable scholars have studied 
plagiarism, the overwhelming majority has focused on its prevention. Passing few have asked whether 
and why plagiarism norms are justified. As a consequence, plagiarism is woefully under-theorized, and 
the justification for plagiarism norms is unclear.”). 
37. See HOWARD, supra note 36, at 108 (reviewing that modern studies of plagiarism “depict 
plagiarism as a unified field of transgression against common morals . . . . Those who would argue with 
the ethical paradigm are represented as enemies of traditional values, as victims of postmodern delusion, 
or as the uninformed.”); cf. ST. ONGE, supra note 24, at 61 (“Challenging the plagiarism concept itself 
is the verbal equivalent of engaging the Mafia.”). 
38. Jonathan Band & Matt Schruers, Dastar, Attribution, and Plagiarism, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 13–
14 (2005) (observing that a strict rule against plagiarism in written practice would “require the continual 
‘reinvention of the wheel’ at a client’s expense” and “undermine the benefits of lawyers practicing as a 
group”); Petersen & Gregor, supra note 30, at *3 (“Why charge a client to create a document from 
scratch when you can draw concepts, structure and wording from a form agreement in a book, a brief 
prepared by a colleague or even a well-reasoned judicial opinion?”). The economic efficiency argument 
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of brief banks at many firms—from which associates are encouraged to plagiarize—
is perhaps the best evidence of this economic efficiency.39 The brief banks exist, of 
course, because plagiarizing from earlier work saves the firm and its clients’ time 
and money.40 Judicial efforts to promote a thick norm against plagiarism, then, stifle 
wider distribution of important economic efficiencies.41 
Plagiarism as a cost-effective method of brief drafting finds most salience with 
attorneys who serve under-resourced clients. Peter Joy and Kevin McMunigal offer 
the persuasive example of a rural public defender plagiarizing a brief filed by a 
national advocacy group in order to cost-effectively represent an indigent client.42 
It is hard to dismiss the argument that a liberalized plagiarism regime might facilitate 
access to justice for under-resourced communities.43 Consider that two out of three 
 
in favor of plagiarism rests, of course, on a presumption that the plagiarizing attorney passes cost-
savings on to the client. Notably, there is a species of plagiarism cases where the plagiarizing attorney 
did not pass on the cost-savings to clients; rather, the attorney billed the client as though he or she had 
taken the time to draft a wholly original brief. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics and 
Conduct v. Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 2002) (suspending attorney six months for plagiarizing brief 
and then charging client $16,000 for 80 hours of work on the brief); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Farmer, 
855 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio 2006) (suspending attorney for two years and requiring disgorgement of fees 
collected to draft plagiarized brief). These are, first and foremost, cases involving fraudulent billing, 
which, of course, requires a heavy sanction. I do not view these cases as relevant to plagiarism doctrine. 
39. See Robin F. Hansen & Alexandra Anderson, Law Student Plagiarism: Contemporary 
Challenges and Responses, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 416, 420–21 (2015) (noting practice of sharing documents 
within a firm). 
40. See Peter Joy & Kevin McMunigal, The Problems of Plagiarism as an Ethics Offense,  
26 CRIM. JUST. 56, 57 (2011) (reviewing that firms and government offices encourage attorneys to 
plagiarize from brief banks “to avoid the delay and expense of creating litigation documents from 
scratch.”). 
41. See Isaacs, supra note 35, at 430 (observing the ability to copy other attorney’s work “moves 
society towards a more optimal economic situation” by increasing “the ability of members of the public 
to obtain restitution for harm at a cheaper price.”); N.C. Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 14 (2009) (rejecting 
sanction for attorney plagiarism in part on grounds that “the utilization of the work of others in this 
context furthers the interests of the client by reducing the amount of time required to prepare a brief 
and thus reducing the charge to the client.”). 
42. Joy & McMunigal, supra note 40, at 57–58. 
43. See Issacs, supra note 35, at 396 (noting that cost-savings obtained by copying other 
attorneys' work promotes “access to adequate legal representation for more than simply our wealthiest 
citizens, and this benefit is a fundamental principle underlying the American justice system.”).  
This affordability argument in favor of plagiarism has an important limitation. It is the plagiarist’s act 
of copying, not the failure to give attribution to the original author, that saves time and money. In that 
sense, the economic efficiency argument champions only a liberalized copying norm where attorneys are 
free to copy wholesale a third-party’s work. Why not, then, just a liberalized copying norm but one that 
still requires an attorney to give attribution to the original author? As an initial matter, courts admit to 
giving short shrift to long passages placed in quotes and given proper attribution. Thus, this advice 
from Justice Scalia: “Be especially loath to use a lengthy, indented quotation. It invites skipping. In fact, 
many block quotes have probably never been read by anyone. So never let your point be made only in 
the indented quotation.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART 
OF PERSUADING JUDGES 128 (2008); see also Alex Kozinzski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 BYU L. REV. 325, 
329 (1992) (expressing a disdain for block quotes and suggesting judges do not read them). Moreover, 
even if a long block quote did not induce a reader to entirely skip the relevant analysis, in many cases, 
the attribution itself would make the argument less persuasive. An attorney plagiarist can copy from a 
variety of sources—earlier judicial opinions, the briefs of other attorneys, and secondary sources. 
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Americans would struggle to raise $1000 to pay for legal services.44 This means that 
a wide swath of Americans, if they are able to obtain legal services in the first place, 
cannot reasonably pay for an attorney to take the time to write an original brief from 
scratch.45 
If plagiarism allows some Americans to obtain legal services that would 
otherwise be out of their financial reach, then a rule against plagiarism exacts a social 
cost. For the purposes of this article, it is not necessary to precisely weigh the 
efficiency interests that would obtain if the current anti-plagiarism rule were 
abrogated. What matters is there are at least some costs associated with the existing 
norm against plagiarism in written advocacy. Against these costs, however modest 
they may be, must be balanced the values served by the anti-plagiarism rule. 
***** 
There are three parties whose interests might be served by the rule against 
plagiarism in a brief: the court, the client, and the original (plagiarized) author. If a 
court itself has an interest offended by plagiarism, it would arise out of the court’s 
role as the intended audience of the plagiarized brief. However, as I review in Part 
I below, the court’s claimed interest in original, non-plagiarized briefing is illusory. 
As others have noted, by any reasonable standard of judicial decision-making, courts 
do not review briefs for their originality; they review them solely to assess the merits 
of the embedded arguments. 
Does plagiarism offend the client’s interest? In Part II, I examine the 
argument that an anti-plagiarism rule is necessary to protect clients’ interests 
because plagiarism goes hand-in-hand with incompetent motion practice. But this 
argument rests on the faulty premise that there is a material correlation between 
plagiarism and incompetent practice. In a world of brief banks and other 
mechanisms of competent plagiarism, that premise does not withstand scrutiny. If 
anything, the stronger presumption is that most plagiarism is competently executed 
and serves the client’s interests by allowing an attorney to produce an effective brief 
at a lower cost. 
Finally, there are the original authors, whose interests I examine in Part III. 
In the first place, plagiarism might infringe upon an original author’s copyright 
 
Imagine if an attorney copied from an uncitable unpublished decision or from a decision of a lower 
court from a far-flung jurisdiction. Or perhaps plagiarized from another attorney’s brief found online. 
It is certainly conceivable that the arguments presented would be less persuasive to a court if an  
attorney were compelled to give attribution to the originating source. See Rebecca Tushnet, Naming  
Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 787, 796–98 (2007) (reviewing circumstances where 
a rule of attribution would distract audiences from goal of text); POSNER, supra note 5, at 62–64 
(discussing “awkwardness of acknowledgment” that might undermine impact of a copied writing). 
44. See generally Don Lee, Nearly Half of U.S. Households Would Struggle with an Unexpected 
$400 Expense, Fed Study Finds, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2016; Ken Sweet & Emily Swanson, Poll: Two-
thirds of US Would Struggle to Cover $1,000 Crisis, AP NEWS, May 19, 2016. 
45. While the question eludes precision, it seems a reasonable presumption that a “from-
scratch” brief involving independent research, precise analysis, and crafted paragraphs and sentences 
would bill out at more than $1000. 
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interest. But as I review in Part IIIA, it is unclear why courts would be interested 
in proactively monitoring what is essentially an economic interest of a party foreign 
to the case under supervision. And, in any event, the copyright interests offended 
by plagiarism in a brief are barely perceptible; they fall far short of offering a 
counter-weight to the democratic access-to-justice values that would be served by 
full abolition of the plagiarism rule. 
In any event, most legal writers finding their work plagiarized in a brief would 
not feel an economic harm so much as a dignitary one. In Part IIIB, I explore the 
argument that irrespective of copyright, plagiarism in written practice offends an 
original author’s non-economic attribution interest—roughly, the right to any 
esteem that might flow from the work. I conclude, however, that this “moral rights” 
theory of plagiarism is founded on an antiquated “romantic” model of individual 
authorship that hardly reflects modern written practice, which is often collaborative 
and always derivative. In the end, a legal writer’s dignitary interests offended by any 
act of plagiarism in a brief are just too diffuse to discern, much less enforce. 
I. THE COURT’S INTEREST 
The strength of the judicial language used to describe lawyer plagiarism—
“reprehensible,” “obnoxious,” “wholly intolerable”—leaves the impression that a 
lawyer’s plagiarism personally offends the court, undermining its very ability to 
administer justice in a case. Perhaps there is something to this: the court is the 
intended audience of a plagiarized brief, and enforcing an anti-plagiarism rule makes 
perfectly good sense when plagiarism undermines the interests of the intended 
audience. 
In The Little Book of Plagiarism, Judge Posner explained plagiarism norms from 
a law and economics perspective.46 In Posner’s telling, an institution’s plagiarism 
norm can be rationally (read: economically) explained by a focus on whether the 
intended audience “detrimentally relies” on plagiarized work.47 That is, if the 
intended audience is induced to take some sort of action believing the submitting 
writer’s ideas and prose are original, then plagiarism is rightly disfavored.48 
Thus, under the detrimental reliance theory, plagiarism is proscribed in the 
academy because the intended audience takes a particular course of action relying 
on a presumption that the submitted writing is original.49 The professor awards a 
student writer a grade along a class curve on a presumption that the student’s work 
 
46. POSNER, supra note 5, at 10. 
47. Id. at 19; see also RANDALL, supra note 36, at 15 (observing that one feature of historical 
plagiarism definitions is that it is “a misrepresentation of one’s self in situations where the justified 
expectations of others entail honesty and authenticity; in other words, it is a form of fraud.”) (emphasis 
in original); ST. ONGE, supra note 24, at 101 (suggesting that plagiarism is an intentional verbal fraud 
for “unearned advantages”). 
48. POSNER, supra note 5, at 19–20. 
49. Joy & McMunigal, supra note 40, at 57–58 (observing that plagiarism norms prevail in the 
academy because “[o]riginality is a critical criterion in assessing the quality of such work.”). 
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is original. A faculty committee awards a colleague tenure on a presumption that 
colleague’s scholarship is original. In either context, if the intended audience knew 
that the work was not original, the audience would have responded in a materially 
different manner: The professor would have awarded the student a lower grade;50 
the faculty committee would have denied their colleague tenure.51 Through the 
prism of detrimental reliance, the thick norm against plagiarism in the academy 
finds an easy theoretical purchase. 
To turn the coin, in transactional law practice, the intended audience for an 
attorney’s work product is made up only of the parties to the contract in question. 
The parties to a contract do not rely in any manner on a presumption that their 
contract was originally composed; they take no action on a belief that the written 
contract is an attorney’s wholly original composition.52 Through the prism of 
detrimental reliance, then, the norm tolerating plagiarism in transactional practice 
also finds solid purchase. 
The detrimental reliance theory is persuasive, but does it vindicate a rule 
against plagiarism before the courts? The operative question becomes whether the 
courts rely to their detriment on a presumption that the analysis and writing in a 
brief are original. Asked another way, relying on a presumption that a brief is an 
original work product, does a court take some material action it would not take if 
the court was aware that the brief in question was largely plagiarized? Plainly, the 
answer is no. 
The suggestion that a court might rule one way presuming counsel submitted 
original work, but rule another way if the court were aware that counsel’s work was 
not original is deeply problematic. Imagine a judge explaining that “had I known 
the analysis in the brief was not original, I would have decided the case differently.” 
As others have noted, this notion cannot be squared with any reasonable theory of 
judicial decision-making: courts are charged with resolving cases based on the force 
of the arguments presented, not their originality.53 Tellingly, a number of courts 
 
50. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 47 (reviewing unfair advantage obtained by plagiarist in a 
classroom where grades are awarded based on original production); see also Hansen & Anderson, supra 
note 39, at 420–21 (2015) (observing that in law school, plagiarists “unfairly” compete for grades among 
their peers). 
51. Bast & Samuels, supra note 33, at 793 (“If scholarship is represented as original when it is 
not, reviewers are relying on a material misstatement in their decision-making.”); see also Klinge v. Ithaca 
Coll., 634 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (upholding demotion of tenured professor based on plagiarism 
offense). 
52. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 20 (“The reader has to care about being deceived about authorial 
identity in order for the deceit to cross the line to fraud and thus constitute plagiarism.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
53. Petersen & Gregor, supra note 30, at *8 (“[T]he court’s purpose in reviewing a brief is not 
primarily to evaluate the personal creativity and skill of the lawyer, but to learn the law, apply it to the 
facts and decide the controversy. Most unacknowledged copying does not degrade the integrity of the 
court, given its purpose.”); Benjamin Shatz & Colin McGrath, Beg, Borrow, Steal: Plagiarism vs. Copying 
in Legal Writing, 26 CAL. LITIG. 14, 15 (2013) (“Legal arguments are presented to courts for evaluation 
of their merits, not their origins. The quality of an attorney’s presentation may be a factor of its 
persuasiveness, but is not itself directly evaluated.”); cf. Douglas Abrams, Plagiarism in Lawyers’ 
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admonishing counsel for plagiarism take pains to explain that the plagiarism did not 
impact their decision-making.54 That is, the courts acknowledge that to resolve the 
case before them, they have not relied on a presumption that the lawyers’ briefs were 
originally composed. 
Still, while courts may not reasonably rely on a presumption of originality 
when resolving particular cases, the norm against plagiarism might arguably address 
more informal forms of detrimental reliance. The court reviewing a plagiarized brief 
might, for instance, develop a higher professional respect for a plagiarizing attorney 
based on a belief that a quality brief was the attorney’s own work product. Perhaps 
a norm against plagiarism protects against a lawyer’s misrepresentation of his or her 
professional skill. 
But here you run into what might be called the “plagiarizing senior attorney” 
contradiction. It is not news that senior attorneys often file briefs under their own 
signature that are largely plagiarized from the work of junior attorneys.55 (There is 
also the practice of judges signing briefs largely written by their clerks.)56 Surely, in 
 
Advocacy: Imposing Discipline for Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice, 47 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 921, 931 (2012) (quoting court of appeals Judge John Godbold: “Cases are won on the facts 
and the law, not on the eminence, polished writing, oratory, or personality of counsel.”). 
54. See United States v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 1213, 1219 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We separate the merits 
of the issues raised from the conduct of counsel . . . .”); Frith v. State, 325 N.E.2d 186, 188–89  
(Ind. 1975) (“In spite of the brief-writer’s disregard for [plagiarism norms], we have considered 
Appellant’s legal arguments as if they had been properly [cited].”);Vasquez v. City of Jersey City,  
No. 03-CV-5369 ( JLL), 2006 WL 1098171, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006) (noting that “Court’s opinion 
has not been affected by defense counsel’s unprofessional submission”). Notably, whether the courts 
truly “detrimentally rely” on originality in a brief has already been litigated in the context of “legal 
ghostwriting,” the practice where an attorney drafts, as part of unbundled legal services, a brief for a 
pro se litigant to file. A persistent early ethical question about the practice was whether the ghostwriting 
attorney (or the pro se litigant) must disclose the attorney’s authorship. See generally In re Fengling Liu, 
664 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. 2011). Early in the debate, those favoring a disclosure rule asserted detrimental 
reliance, arguing that courts, relying on a presumption of original authorship, might extend pro se 
litigants solicitude that would not be offered if the court knew of an attorney’s role in authoring a 
pleading. See, e.g., Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271–72 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding attorney’s action 
providing legal assistance to pro se litigant without disclosing relationship to court improperly affords 
pro se litigant the benefit of the “court’s liberal construction of pro se pleadings.”). In 2007, however, 
the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a formal opinion that 
attorneys need not disclose the nature of their assistance to a pro se litigant. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 
& Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007). The standing committee specifically rejected the 
detrimental reliance argument, finding no merit in the notion that a court’s decision-making might be 
informed by the identity of the author of a pleading. Id. 
55. Lisa G. Lerman, Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and 
Authorship, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 469 (2001) (reviewing practice where an associate at a law firm 
“may write memos, briefs, and articles, many of which will be filed, circulated, or published without his 
name on them or with his name listed after the names of more senior lawyers in the firm.”); Joy & 
McMunigal, supra note 40, at 57 (reviewing practice where “the name of a lawyer who did no actual 
research or writing, such as a partner or local counsel, may appear prominently on a brief or pleading.”). 
56. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 20–21 (reviewing that only a small minority of judges write 
their own opinions). A related practice is courts’ issuance of orders and opinions that largely  
plagiarize one of the party’s submissions. See Douglas R. Richmond, Unoriginal Sin: The Problem of  
Judicial Plagiarism, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1077, 1079 (2013) (observing widespread practice of courts  
adopting wholesale from proposed orders submitted by a party); see also Jaime S. Dursht, Note, Judicial  
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some corners, these senior attorneys burnish their professional reputations on the 
back of the unattributed work product of more junior attorneys. But it is beyond 
dispute that these practices do not raise the judicial eyebrows.57 If courts were truly 
concerned that plagiarism distorts a lawyer’s professional attributes, these practices 
would not be roundly tolerated. 
II. THE CLIENT’S INTERESTS 
With the conclusion that plagiarized briefs do not offend any legitimate 
interest of the courts, the question becomes whether a plagiarized brief might 
offend some interest of the client. In the first, it’s important to note that the 
efficiencies of plagiarism—the savings in cost and time—properly redound to the 
benefit of the client. If plagiarism in a brief competently presents the client’s case 
and saves the client money, from the client’s perspective, there is much to like. But 
that conclusion rests, of course, on the premise that plagiarism can be a part and 
parcel of a competent brief. Notably, many courts appear to have rejected this 
premise, effectively equating plagiarism with incompetent brief drafting. In this 
sense, the courts tacitly endorse the argument that a norm proscribing plagiarism 
serves as an important bulwark against incompetent practice. 
Consider the so-called “Lindsay Lohan” plagiarism case. In March 2011, the 
recording artist known as Pitbull released a song with a verse that referenced the 
actress Lindsay Lohan by name.58 Ms. Lohan did not appreciate the name-drop, and 
she retained New York Attorney Stephanie Ovadia to sue Pitbull and his record 
 
Plagiarism: It May Be Fair Use but Is It Ethical, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1253, 1294–96 (1996) (arguing 
in favor of amendments to Canon 2 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to discourage judicial 
plagiarism). A number of appellate courts have heard due process challenges by losing parties after a 
trial court issued an opinion parroting near verbatim the prevailing parties’ papers. While appellate 
courts are skeptical of judicial plagiarism, they have stopped short of banning the practice. See, e.g., 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985) (“[O]ur previous discussions of the subject 
suggest that even when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the 
court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.”). 
57. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 21, 25 (observing that the practice of senior attorneys and 
judges submitting another attorney’s work under their own signature is widely known and tolerated). 
Under his law and economics analysis, Posner explains that detrimental reliance principles are not 
offended by the plagiarizing senior attorney because, in effect, everyone knows that the senior attorney 
did not draft the brief that he filed under his signature. Id. at 20–22. To Posner, because industry 
insiders are aware of the practice, there is no concealment, and in the absence of concealment, the 
detrimental reliance element of plagiarism is missing. Id. at 17–19. This logic is appealing and would 
seem to invite a defense of all attorney plagiarism on grounds that everyone knows that lawyers rarely 
submit wholly original work (Posner did not reach the discrete issue of attorneys plagiarizing from 
third-parties). Still, I think a more persuasive explanation for tolerance of senior attorneys’ and judges’ 
plagiarism of junior attorneys’ written work rests on “work for hire” principles. See infra note 82 and 
accompanying text. 
58. See Lohan v. Perez, 924 F. Supp. 2d 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). The song at issue was titled “Give 
Me Everything.” Id. at 451. Roughly one-third of the way into the song, the following verse is  
offered: “So, I’m tiptoein’, to keep flowin’/I got it locked up like Lindsay Lohan.” Id. 
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company.59 The suit was not well-founded, and Pitbull’s attorneys quickly filed a 
motion to dismiss.60 In turn, Attorney Ovadia’s office filed a brief opposing 
dismissal. The brief was a clutter of plagiarism. 
In a published opinion, the court observed that “the vast majority of Ovadia’s 
brief appears to have been taken from other sources without any acknowledgment 
or identification of the sources.”61 Among the cut and pasted sources were a 
periodical named Art World, case law, other firm’s websites, articles found on the 
web, and Wikipedia.62 Moreover, the brief itself, including the embedded plagiarism, 
was taken nearly verbatim from a legal memorandum that Ovadia’s office had 
previously filed in an entirely different case.63 Thus, the brief was “rife with 
irrelevant discussion;” it “did not meaningfully address Defendant’s arguments,” 
and “it cited a case that had been subsequently reversed.”64 
Contempt for Attorney Ovadia’s incompetent motion practice is well-
placed.65 Indeed, Ovadia’s filed brief seems fine-tuned for a sanction under Model 
Rule 1.1’s duty of competence. But the court did not sanction Ovadia for 
incompetence; it sanctioned only Ovadia’s plagiarism, which the court found 
“obviously” unacceptable.66 In turn, the New York court, like the Iowa court in 
Cannon, used the plagiarism offense to fashion a sanction under Model Rule 8.4(c)’s 
prohibition of “misrepresentation.”67 
 
59. Attorney Ovadia filed a complaint under New York’s Civil Rights Law, which, among other 
provisions, affords citizens a right of privacy that precludes others from using their name and 
personality for purposes of commercial benefit. See id. at 453–54. On its face, the statute does seem to 
endorse Ms. Lohan’s lawsuit. Id. But the New York law is pocketed with exceptions that plainly 
insulated Pitbull’s namedrop from triggering liability. Id. at 455–56. 
60. Id. at 450. 
61. Id. at 458. 
62. See id. 
63. Id. at 458 n.6. 
64. Id. It was Pitbull’s legal team that discovered Ovadia’s plagiarism; it filed a motion for 
Ovadia to be sanctioned. Id. at 457. With the motion, the legal team filed a self-styled “Similarity 
Report” tracking Ovadia’s alleged plagiarism in remarkable detail. Id. at 458 n.7. Notably, the defense 
scheme left the court “underwhelmed”; it tersely rejected the defendants’ claim that they should receive 
any fines imposed. Id. at 461 n.13. 
65. There was a dispute as to whether Attorney Ovadia or an affiliated attorney drafted the 
offending brief. The dispute was of no consequence to the court: “It is clear, however, that only 
Attorney Ovadia signed the Opposition. In the Court’s view, this leaves Attorney Ovadia solely liable 
for the sanctionable plagiarism.” Id. at 460. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 460 n.12. The court imposed a $750 fine for Ovadia’s motion practice, but noted  
that, while the fine was “a relatively modest amount,” it “accounted for (and does not underestimate) 
the negative impact on Attorney Ovadia’s reputation and livelihood that will inevitably arise from  
her involvement in this situation.” Id. The court was right about the negative attention.  
See, e.g., Natalie Finn & Baker Machado, Pitbull on the Attack: Accuses Lindsay Lohan’s Attorney  
of. . .Plagiarism?!, E NEWS (Mar. 23, 2012, 3:49 PM), https://www.eonline.com/news/303676/ 
pitbull-on-the-attack-accuses-lindsay-lohan-s-attorney-of-plagiarism [https://perma.cc/7HXS-
2GXP]; Eriq Gardner, Lindsay Lohan’s Lawyer Accused of Plagiarism in Pitbull Lawsuit (Exclusive), 
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 22, 2012, 11:15 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/
lindsay-lohan-pitbull-lawsuit-lawyer-accused-plagiarism-303440 [https://perma.cc/4FJL-3KX8].  
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To be sure, the Ovadia matter demonstrates that plagiarism can be part and 
parcel of an incompetent motion practice. And there are other cases where courts 
have likewise hinged a plagiarism sanction on an argument that counsel’s plagiarism 
led to an unhelpful, incompetent brief.68 But do these cases offer a compelling 
correlation between plagiarism and incompetent practice? Surely, plagiarism can 
sometimes lead to a deficient filing. But it can also surely produce competent 
briefing. Recall that Peter Cannon was caught because of the “high quality of his 
brief.” Recall also the widespread use of “brief banks” in many legal organizations, 
which expressly invite plagiarism in the interests of cost-savings. Is this reliance on 
brief banks producing an epidemic of incompetent motion practice? Of course not. 
Rather, the reasonable presumption is that most plagiarism is competently 
executed—so much so that it passes by unnoticed. 
In the end there are serious overbreadth issues with a rule that seeks to ban all 
plagiarism on grounds that it is sometimes a component of deficient motion practice. 
As Peter Joy and Kevin McMunigal have argued, the better approach for regulating 
conduct like Attorney Ovadia’s is for courts to proceed exclusively under Model 
Rule 1.1’s duty of competence.69 Regulating incompetence through an anti-
plagiarism rule simply doesn’t make sense; it expresses a distortedly broad 
proscriptive rule.70 
I find more appealing the argument that a plagiarism proscription encourages 
competent practice because, by compelling largely original analysis, the rule assures 
that a lawyer fully commands the law and facts of her case. Legal writing scholarship 
has long recognized the “cognitivist school” of composition theory, which posits 
that writing not simply a recitation of already fully-formed knowledge; rather,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68. See, e.g., Pagan Velez v. Laboy Alvarado, 145 F. Supp. 146, 160–61 (D.P.R. 2001) 
(admonishing counsel’s plagiarism in brief which “did not fully address all the arguments raised in 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.”); USA Clio Biz, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor,  
No. 97 CV 250, 1998 WL 57176 at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1998) (noting that plagiarized brief was “so 
factually inaccurate and so wholly unresponsive to the issues at hand that it seemed to the Court to 
have been written for a matter other than the one at bar”). 
69. See Joy & McMunigal, supra note 40, at 49–50. 
70. See Shatz & McGrath, supra note 53, at 18 (“[A]ttaching the ‘plagiarism’ label to all forms of 
attorney copying masks the true ethical concerns involved — namely, whether the attorney drafted an 
argument tailored to the specific facts and circumstances of the case and was diligent in researching the 
law and finding up-to-date, relevant supporting authority.”). 
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writing itself is a potent element of building knowledge.71 In the words of legal 
writing scholar Mary Beth Beazley: 
[W]e now realize that writing is more than the hands taking dictation from 
the brain. When we write, we engage in brainstorming with ourselves. We 
question and challenge our presumptions, discover new ways of thinking 
about something and gain insights that had not occurred to us before we 
began to write.72 
I do not quarrel with the notion that by “writing” her case, an attorney obtains 
a fuller command of her argument. As an aspirational goal for practice, original 
composition as a norm has much to argue for. But the economic reality remains 
that many of those in need of legal services simply do not have the resources to pay 
for their lawyer’s “high-end” cognitivist endeavors.73 For these under-resourced 
Americans, a plagiarized brief is surely better than no brief at all. 
III. THE ORIGINAL AUTHOR’S INTEREST 
If neither the courts nor clients are cognizable “victims” of plagiarism, we are 
left with the plagiarized authors themselves. The argument that an anti-plagiarism 
rule is necessary to protect the interests of original authors has immediate appeal. 
 
71. See, e.g., J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69  
WASH. L. REV. 35, 54–55 (1994) (“Traditional views of writing—embodied in the formalist 
perspective—are characterized by a sense that the primary function of writing is communication. In the 
epistemic view, writing is used not only to communicate knowledge, but also to generate knowledge. 
That is, writing plays a role in thinking.”). The efficacy of legal writing courses in American law schools 
turns on these cognitivist impacts of the writing process: The first year legal writing curriculum is not 
valuable because it teaches the “skill” of memo and brief writing; rather, it is valuable because it 
harnesses the cognitive processes of writing to teach the deeper logic of legal reasoning. See, e.g., Philip 
C. Kissam, Thinking (By Writing) About Legal Writing, 40 VAND. L. REV. 135, 140 (1987) (“This focus 
on instrumental writing misses the fundamental point that the writing process itself can serve as an 
independent source, or critical standard, that alters and enriches the nature of legal thought.”); see also 
Mary Beth Beazley, Better Writing, Better Thinking: Using Legal Writing Pedagogy in the “Casebook” 
Classroom (Without Grading Papers), 10 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 23, 48 (2004). 
Thus, even if plagiarism in practice should be largely tolerated, it does not necessarily follow that 
students should be taught the “skill” of plagiarism in law school, at least not in the first year when the 
so-called “cognitive apprenticeship” is paramount. See Robin F. Hansen & Alexandra Anderson, Law 
Student Plagiarism: Contemporary Challenges and Responses, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 416, 420–21 (2015) 
(reviewing prevalence of non-attribution in practice but arguing that plagiarism must necessarily be 
proscribed in law school because of pedagogical values of original composition);see also Kim  
D. Chanbonpin, Legal Writing, the Remix: Plagiarism and Hip Hop Ethics, 63 MERCER L. REV. 597, 
633–34 (advising law professors to help students avoid cut-and-paste plagiarism in favor of “expert 
remixing”). On the other hand, Rebecca Moore Howard has argued that the strict academic intolerance 
of plagiarism undermines the pedagogical value of “patch-writing,” which she describes as copying 
from a source text and then deleting some words, “altering grammatical structures, or plugging in one-
for-one synonym substitutes.” Rebecca Moore Howard, A Plagiarism Pentimento, 11.3 J. TEACHING 
WRITING 233, 233 (Summer 1993). Moore persuasively argues that patch-writing is an effective method 
of composition to introduce students to new ideas and vocabulary and that the academy’s strict anti-
plagiarism rules undermine “our students in their efforts to assimilate the constructs of unfamiliar 
discourse.” Id. 
72. MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 7 (10th vol. 2014). 
73. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text. 
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There is always the sense that the plagiarist has “stolen” something from the original 
author; hence, the oft-cited definition of plagiarism as “literary theft”.74 
But what exactly has the plagiarizing attorney stolen from an original author? 
First, there is the original author’s interest in controlling the copying of her work. 
This is an economic interest well-defined by American copyright law. At bottom, it 
is the right to charge a reasonable fee for the copying of one’s original work. Second, 
there is the original author’s “moral” interest in receiving attribution for her work; 
this is a non-economic, dignitary interest—a right to receive, as it were, the “esteem” 
that might flow the work.75 
Certainly, one can contemplate a hypothetical where an attorney’s plagiarism 
might offend these interests of original authors. However, when examined against 
the backdrop of practice realities, both the original author’s copyright interest and 
her dignitary interest in attribution are nearly imperceptible. They simply do not 
countervail the important access-to-justice values that would be served by tolerance 
of plagiarism. 
A. Copyright Interests 
As an initial matter, a “copyright protection” theory of plagiarism suffers from 
a foundational misapprehension. The goal of copyright is to protect a writer’s 
economic interest in controlling the copying of her work.76 But with the plagiarism 
offense, copying the work of another is only a predicate act; it is the subsequent 
failure of attribution that is the essential element.77 And American copyright law is 
largely disinterested in attribution. For sure, if you own a copyright in a work, as a 
condition of license you can demand attribution.78 But in the many circumstances 
where there is no enforceable copyright, American intellectual property law does 
not recognize a right to attribution.79 
And even if the plagiarism offense was properly concerned with copyright, it’s 
not clear why the courts would be so interested in proactively monitoring the private 
economic interests of a party wholly unrelated to the litigation. If an attorney’s 
 
74. See ST. ONGE, supra note 24, at 6 (reviewing multitude of “felonious parallels” ascribed to 
the act of plagiarism). 
75. See generally RANDALL, supra note 36, at 14 (suggesting plagiarism doctrine serves two 
interests—one defined by market value and the other defined by “the symbolic or aesthetic value of a 
discourse”). 
76. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 46–47 (observing that “[c]opyright infringement is the invasion 
of a property right. It is like joyriding, that is, ‘renting’ a car without paying any rent.”). 
77. See ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY (1951) (“There can be no 
plagiarism without the thief passing as the originator. The essence of the wrong . . . is the 
misappropriation of the fruits of another person’s mental labor and skill.”). 
78. Thus, the familiar “Creative Commons” license, where a scholar controlling a copyright 
provides a license to the public to copy his work on condition that the scholar is given attribution. 
79. Band & Schruers, supra note 38, at 4–5 (contrasting copyright and plagiarism); Frye, supra 
note 5, at 165 (observing that attribution is irrelevant under copyright law); Robert Rosenthal Kwall, 
Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 
1997 (2006) (explaining that copyright law does not specifically protect against misattribution). 
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plagiarism in a brief causes some real economic harm, the original author, if she 
enjoys a worthy copyright, can protect her own interests. Notably, sophisticated 
litigation practices long ago began affixing a copyright to their pleadings. And law 
firms have threatened legal action to protect their interests against bad faith actors.80 
With copyright holders able to protect their own interests and judicial resources 
limited, one is hard-pressed to make sense of the court’s proactive monitoring of 
third-party copyright interests through a professional rule against plagiarism. 
That said, while the “copyright-protection theory” of plagiarism is an 
imperfect tool for addressing attribution rights, it nonetheless offers ready-made 
law; relying upon copyright law spares the courts from having to enter the quagmire 
of plagiarism doctrine. And copyright law does offer rules that might bring some 
coherence to plagiarism doctrine. Consider the “senior partner plagiarist 
contradiction” that describes how courts condemn plagiarism generally while 
wholly tolerating the practice of senior attorneys plagiarizing junior attorneys. 
Copyright law easily resolves this tension through application of “work for hire” 
principles—the senior attorney “owns” the attribution right by dint of the 
employer-employee relationship.81 
Still, the circumstances in which a plagiarized brief might infringe on a 
copyright are difficult to conjure. Lawyers submitting arguments to the court 
generally plagiarize from three sources: judicial opinions, other attorneys’ briefs, and 
secondary sources. Copying from judicial opinions simply does not raise copyright 
issues—judicial opinions are solidly in the public domain and can be copied by 
anyone for any reason. And copying from other attorneys’ briefs or secondary 
sources, except in the most extreme circumstances, is fair use under the Copyright 
Act. In the end, while copyright law may bring some coherence to plagiarism 
doctrine, the anti-plagiarism rule that it supports is so pinched that it hardly seems 
worth the effort. 
1. Judicial Opinions 
The rule that judicial opinions are solidly in the public domain and beyond any 
claim to their copyright is well founded. The United States Supreme Court first 
 
80. See Thomas G. Field, Jr., From Copyright to Law in Copyright, 49 IDEA 125, 131 (2008) 
(discussing copyright disputes over copying of litigation documents in national class action practice); 
Issacs, supra note 35, at 392 (reviewing copyright infringements claims being asserted among national 
class action firms; one firm was plagiarizing the “narrative” complaints of the other while competing 
for class counsel action). 
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). Section 201(b) provides that “‘in the case of a work made for 
hire,’” employers are considered authors for the purposes of copyright, unless there is written agreement 
otherwise. See also Field, supra note 80, at 135–45 (discussing work for hire principles in the academic 
setting); Issacs, supra note 35, at 400 (“[A] law firm associate’s legal works are ‘works made for hire,’ 
and the law firm itself is considered the author of those works.”). A more challenging question is 
whether under “work-for-hire” principles, the paying client is in fact the owner of a copyright in a brief. 
See generally Issacs, supra note 35, at 400–01. 
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announced the rule that federal opinions enjoy no copyright in 1834.82 The rule was 
later written directly into the Copyright Act.83 It is technically true that no court has 
ever been called to consider whether state courts might assert copyright in their 
opinions.84 But that is presumably because the logic of a rule against copyright in 
court opinions is unimpeachable.85 
To begin, there is a compelling “work for hire” notion: it is the public that 
pays judges to write opinions; it reasonably follows that those opinions are 
collectively owned by the public. As the Supreme Court explained over a century 
ago: “Judges, as is well understood, receive from the public treasury a stated annual 
salary, fixed by law, and can themselves have no pecuniary interest or 
proprietorship, as against the public at large, in the fruits of their judicial labors.”86 
But it is not simply that the public necessarily owns the work of government 
employees, there is also the “metaphorical concept of citizen ownership” whereby 
“[t]he citizens are the authors of the law, and therefore its owners, regardless of who 
actually drafts the provisions, because the law derives its authority from the consent 
of the public, expressed through the democratic process.”87 Finally, there are due 
process considerations underlying the rule against copyrighting statutes and judicial 
opinions. In order to hold citizens responsible for abiding with the laws, they must 
have free access.88 In sum, under a copyright protection theory of plagiarism, there 
is no basis for sanctioning plagiarism of a court opinion. There is simply no 
copyright interest to vindicate. 
 
82. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834) (“[We] are unanimously of opinion, that  
no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court; and that  
the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right.”); see also Banks v. Manchester,  
128 U.S. 244, 254 (1888) (“The whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and 
interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a 
declaration of unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or a statute”.). 
83. The Copyright Act denies protection to “work of the United States Government.”  
17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006). 
84. The most analogous modern case law considers whether the drafter of a model building 
code can claim copyright after adoption by a local government. These cases resolve against copyright 
based on “democratic values” that would apply with equal or greater force to state judicial opinions.  
See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 2002). 
85. See Field, supra note 80, at 128–29 (observing it is likely that the “Supreme Court would 
refuse copyright for state court opinions.”). 
86. Banks, 128 U.S. at 253–54. 
87. Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980) (quoting 
Banks v. West, 27 F. 50, 57 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886)). 
88. See id. (noting “the very important and practical policy that citizens must have free access to 
the laws which govern them. This policy is, at bottom, based on the concept of due process.”). 
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2. Other Attorneys’ Briefs 
Whether an attorney holds a copyright interest in an original brief filed with a 
court is an open question.89 But the considerations placing judicial opinions in the 
public domain also argue for a rule that once a brief is filed with the court, it too 
becomes part of the public domain. While the public may not compensate attorneys 
directly for their written work, the public does subsidize the courts, providing both 
the lawyer and her client access to the public justice systems. It is an entirely 
reasonable proposition that in fair exchange for reliance on the public courts, briefs 
filed there become part of the public domain.90 
Nonetheless, most scholars, albeit without considering the “fair exchange” 
argument above, generally accept that litigation documents, especially briefs, can be 
sufficiently original and creative to qualify for copyright protection.91 But most 
scholars also accept that democratic values weigh heavily in favor of labeling as “fair 
use” one advocate’s plagiarism of another.92 
In American copyright law, the fair use doctrine contemplates that an 
otherwise cognizable copyright should not be enforced where a substantial public 
good would flow from the free dissemination of the work.93 Here, of course, the 
 
89. See Issacs, supra note 35, at 402 (observing that the copyrightability of litigation documents 
has not yet been addressed by the courts). The issue has only become salient recently as electronic 
databases have made briefs both easily searchable and easily “cut and pasted.” See id. at 398. 
90. A related, but ultimately unpersuasive argument is that because unsealed litigation 
documents automatically become part of the “public record,” they are beyond copyright protection. 
However, as one district court explained, if filing a public record transformed the document into the 
public domain, “James Joyce’s Ulysses . . . would lie within the public domain merely because the United 
States prosecuted the book . . . a generation ago.” Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 
F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (cited in Carolyn Elefant, Are Legal Briefs Copyrightable?: Yes or 
No and Why it Matters, 2 No. 4 E-FILING REP. 8 (Mar. 2002)). 
91. See Ralph Clifford, Intellectual Property Rights in an Attorney’s Work Product,  
3 S. NEW ENG. ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 1 (2008) (reviewing that most attorney litigation documents 
drafted by an attorney would be “sufficiently creative for copyright protection to be available.”); 1 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.11 (2018) (“There is no validity to the notion that, by virtue of being 
filed in court, legal pleadings lose copyright protection.”); Issacs, supra note 35, at 394 (locating 
sufficient original creative expression in many litigation documents sufficient to qualify for protection); 
Petersen & Gregor, supra note 30, at 3 (“A legal brief would likely qualify for more substantial copyright 
protection, comparable to that afforded a piece of nonfiction writing. The incorporated facts and ideas, 
of course, would not be protected, but the structure and rhetoric of a brief would constitute protectable 
expression.”). 
92. Section 107 of the Copyright Act allows for “fair use” of a copyrighted work without 
permission based on four non-exclusive statutory factors: “1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). The enumerated considerations are only guideposts, they 
are “not exhaustive and do not constitute an algorithm that enables decisions to be ground out 
mechanically.” Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.). 
93. See Issacs, supra note 35, at 426 (reviewing that “fair use” doctrine applies “where 
dissemination of some works creates a significant social benefit unlikely to be addressed by private 
transactions”). 
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public good at play is the core democratic value of access-to-justice. Again, building 
a brief by copying other attorneys’ work can be quite cost-effective, enough so that 
it brings legal services within reach of those who cannot afford a lawyer’s original 
work.94 Recognizing this, even scholars who are otherwise optimistic of a private 
market for briefs95 acknowledge that democratic values should nonetheless limit 
copyright protection of briefs “in order to ensure access to law and to ensure the 
availability and competence of legal services.”96 
I’ll suggest a second democratic value weighing in favor of one attorney’s 
copying of another as constituting “fair use”. Attorneys are officers of the court 
and the key players in our adversarial system of justice—a system that contemplates 
that through the battle of arguments, justice is obtained. All lawyers participate in 
this exercise; each one of our briefs becomes part of a repository of arguments 
through which the law evolves. From this view, to allow attorneys to hoard their 
arguments with copyright protection upends the genius of the common law.97 
Finally, it is worth noting that the key policy arguments in favor of copyright 
protection lose purchase in the context of legal practice. Consider copyright’s policy 
goal of incentivizing writers to do their very best work by providing them a 
protected economic interest in their final product. In our context, the policy 
argument would be that attorneys drafting briefs need the protection of copyright 
in order to be incentivized to do their best work. But the notion that lawyers, in the 
absence of copyright protection, might offer clients something less than their best 
work subverts the ethical rules. As Model Rule 1.1 makes plain, the obligation to 
 
94. See infra notes 38–46 and accompanying text. 
95. Some scholars contemplate that enforcing copyrights in this realm could foster an efficient 
market where attorneys license their briefs to other attorneys in exchange for a fee. See, e.g.,  
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1169, 1198–
99 (2011). 
96. Id. at 1176. See also Clifford, supra note 91, at 34 (“A work-product document being used in 
litigation would seem to at least touch on the sort of purpose that Congress indicated is more likely to 
be fair use. As with the categories expressly stated, litigation advances democracy, a core value to be 
preserved by appropriate application of the fair use defense . . . .”); Issacs, supra note 35, at 396 (“If 
litigation attorneys could be held liable for copyright infringement, the benefits associated with widely 
disseminated litigation documents would cease and there would be a substantial loss to public welfare 
resulting from the higher costs of legal representation.”). To be sure, the democratic values argument 
would lose force in the face of “bad faith” plagiarism where one advocate persistently plagiarized from 
another while competing directly with the original drafter for clients in a discrete legal field. See Issacs, 
supra note 35, at 392 (reviewing copyright infringements claims being asserted among national class 
action firms where one firm was plagiarizing the “narrative” complaints of the other while competing 
for class counsel status). 
97. Ralph Clifford captures this notion by suggesting a fifth “fair use” factor that focuses  
on “legal system considerations” where disallowing copying would be an impediment to the  
development of the common law. See Clifford, supra note 91, at 39–48; cf. Carey v. Kearsley (1802)  
179 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (K.B.) (“[W]hile I shall think myself bound to secure every man in the 
enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon science.”). 
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competently advocate for one’s client is all the incentive an attorney needs to 
produce quality work.98 
3. Secondary Sources 
The attorney that copies a secondary source into a brief presents a better case 
for actionable copyright infringement.99 There is no reasonable argument that 
treatises and law review articles should be within the public domain because of a 
quid pro quo involving public funding. And, arguably the democratic and 
professional values arguing for fair use are muted with regard to copying from 
secondary sources. Still, “fair use” also insulates from sanction “minor” copying 
that falls short of a wholesale copying.100 The usual sort of plagiarism from 
secondary sources—copying a few paragraphs here and there—would be minor 
enough to qualify as fair use.101 Nonetheless, the “copyright theory of plagiarism” 
does provide a basis for sanctioning the more outrageous cases where an advocate 
has plagiarized pages upon pages from a secondary source. 
This is, of course, the exact nature of Peter Cannon’s plagiarism; recall that he 
plagiarized seventeen pages of a nineteen-page brief from an online article. And 
perhaps that answers the question at the top of this Article: Peter Cannon’s 
plagiarism warranted a sanction because its predicate act—the copying—went 
beyond fair use and intruded on the copyright of the authors of the online article.102 
But I’m still unconvinced that protecting the copyright interests of secondary 
source authors offers a reasonable justification for a rule against plagiarism in a 
brief. Copyright interests are, at their heart, economic interests, and even in extreme 
cases, tracking economic harm is near impossible when an attorney files a brief that 
plagiarizes a secondary source. What economic harm, for instance, was suffered by 
the authors of the online article that Peter Cannon plagiarized a single time in a brief 
filed with the Iowa Bankruptcy Court? By relying on copyright law to sanction an 
attorney for copying a secondary source, the court is purporting to vindicate what 
is surely an illusory economic interest. Thus, even in the rare circumstances where 
 
98. See generally Issacs, supra note 35, at 435 (“[P]ermitting unauthorized use of an attorney’s 
work would not likely thwart copyright’s goal of encouraging authors to create works that would 
otherwise not be created without the incentive of temporary market exclusivity.”). 
99. Field, supra note 80, at 128 (2008) (noting that copyright protection for “law reviews, 
commercial treatises” is “unlikely to be disputed”). 
100. See Clifford, supra note 91, at 37. 
101. See id. 
102. Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cannon, 789 N.W.2d 756, 758 (Iowa 2010). 
The Cannon matter also illustrates how a copyright theory of plagiarism would insulate from sanction 
more modest plagiarism. In Cannon, there were actually two acts of plagiarism examined by the Iowa 
Supreme Court. In addition to the sixteen pages plagiarized in his opening brief, Cannon also filed a 
second brief with the Bankruptcy Court. Id. In this second brief, while Cannon wrote most of the text, 
he copied verbatim long string cites from the article he had previously plagiarized. Id. The Iowa Supreme 
Court concluded that the copying of the string cites was not the sort of plagiarism that warranted a 
sanction. Id. That conclusion echoes fair use principles: the copying was too minor to sustain an 
infringement action. 
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plagiarism might offend a cognizable copyright interest, I just do not see how it 
could ever be worth the court’s bother. 
B. Attribution 
In any event, an advocate, judge, or commentator discovering their work 
plagiarized into a brief is likely to be less concerned about the copying than the fact 
that they were not given credit for their work. Again, it is the lack of attribution, not 
the underlying copying, that lies at the heart of the plagiarism offense. 
An original author’s interest in attribution is captured by the so-called “moral 
rights theory” of copyright.103 The moral rights theory recognizes that the author 
who finds her work plagiarized suffers something more than an economic harm; 
rather, the offense is more personal and dignitary.104 Moral rights flow from the 
notion that when an author creates, the written product reflects the author’s self in 
a meaningful way.105 Copying a writer’s work without providing attribution, then, 
exacts an emotional harm that transcends the marketplace. In Stolen Words, Thomas 
Mallon described the author’s interest in attribution this way:  
Think how often, after all, a writer’s books are called his or her children. 
To see the writer’s words kidnapped, to find them imprisoned, like 
changelings, on someone else’s permanent page is to become vicariously 
absorbed by violation. 
 . . .  
From the lyric poem to the scientific footnote, the printed word is the 
writer’s means of proving and perpetuating his existence. The identity of 
self and work, and the prospect of continuation, are more precious to him 
the promiscuous coin of the realm.106 
I find this all a bit overwrought when applied to legal writing. But I recognize 
that there can be a creative aspect of drafting an original opinion, brief, or 
commentary such that the end product can begin to feel like an expression of 
oneself into the world. Spend enough time drafting something and you do feel you 
 
103. The reference to moral rights translates from the French phrase le droit moral. “The 
adjective ‘moral’ has no precise English equivalent, although ‘spiritual’, ‘non-economic’ and ‘personal’ 
convey something of the intended meaning.” SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986 456 (1987). 
104. See Kwall, supra note 79, at 1997 (“Moral rights are aimed at preserving an author’s dignity, 
honor, and autonomy.”); Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 
1180 (2005) (“Society has expressed an entirely independent, somewhat sui generis interest in demarcating 
and ascertaining authorship, unrelated to any instrumental and utilitarian effects that authorial 
attribution may have on markets and productions. In other words, a correct authorial attribution is a 
thing of value in itself.”). 
105. See Kwall, supra note 79, at 1972 (“Central to moral rights is the idea of respect for the 
author’s meaning and message as embodied in a tangible commodity because the author’s meaning and 
message reflect his intrinsic creative process.”). 
106. MALLON, supra note 36, at xiii–xiv, 237. See LINDEY, supra note 77, at 231 (“The theft of a 
product of the mind is more than a legal wrong. It is a moral wrong as well.”). 
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have spun a bit of yourself into the writing. Isn’t there something, then, to a 
“protection of moral rights” theory of plagiarism? 
First off, let’s not get carried away with the notion that modern legal writers 
deeply intertwine themselves into their written work.107 As composition theorists 
have long argued, modern plagiarism norms already reflect an antiquated 
“romantic” model of an autonomous and original author toiling away day upon day 
alone in a room.108 However, since the 1600’s, when modern notions of the 
plagiarism offense rooted,109 production of the written word has changed 
dramatically—think the Guttenberg Press vs. Google Docs or Dropbox.  
The meaning of authorship has changed with it; composition in nearly every realm 
has become more social and collaborative.110 With modern authorship such a fluid 
concept, a plagiarism rule premised on texts being an expression of an individual’s 
existence in the world loses grip.111 
This could not be truer than in modern legal practice, where multiple attorneys 
routinely contribute to a single document. Consider when an attorney plagiarizes a 
judicial opinion. Whose “self” did the plagiarist offend when he failed to give 
attribution? The clerk or clerks that did the original drafting? The judge who made 
changes, however material, and then endorsed the opinion with her signature? The 
persistent collaboration of most legal writing makes enforcement of a moral rights 
theory of plagiarism a fool’s errand.112 
 
107. Cf. Issacs, supra note 35, at 432 (rejecting notion that litigation materials have some sort of 
“inherent artistic purpose”). 
108. See ANDREA LUNSFORD & LISA EDE, SINGULAR TEXTS/PLURAL AUTHORS: 
PERSPECTIVES ON COLLABORATIVE WRITING 5 (1990) (describing “the pervasive commonsense 
assumption that writing is inherently and necessarily a solitary, individual act.”); Tushnet, supra note 43, 
at 805–06 (observing that the “implicit model” of a “single artist whose name deserves to be the only 
name attached” to a single work often “depends on the erasure of key figures . . . who shaped the 
works.”). 
109. See LUNSFORD & EDE, supra note 108, at 78–79 (observing the Renaissance as a “critical 
period of transition” in modern authorship because of both the development of printing and a growing 
“artistic self-consciousness”); Rebecca Moore Howard, Plagiarisms, Authorships, and the Academic 
Death Penalty, in 57 COLLEGE ENGLISH 788, 790–91 (1995) (“The individual author defines the post-
Gutenberg playing field, and that author is credited with the attributes of proprietorship, autonomy, 
originality and morality.”); MALLON, supra note 36, at 4–6 (reviewing that historical practices 
recognizing “necessity of imitation” began to yield in 1600’s to “competitive and personal” notions of 
authorship that emphasized originality). 
110. See HOWARD, supra note 36, at 127 (“[T]he technological innovation of the computer is 
precipitating and accompanying shifts in textual values . . . the computer is ‘dissolving the boundaries 
essential to the survival of our modern fiction of the author as the sole creator of unique, original 
works.’”). 
111. See generally id. at 133 (describing the literary theory that “the cumulative, interactive nature 
of writing [ ] makes impossible the representation of a stable category of authorship and hence a stable 
category of its cohort, plagiarism.”). 
112. See LUNSFORD & EDE, supra note 108, at 85 (“For if texts express an author’s individual 
genius, how can a single text manifest the essential being of more than one person?”); see also Tushnet, 
supra note 43, at 809 (observing that “[t]he more cooks adding ingredients to the recipe, the more 
difficult it is to identify responsibility for the final result”). Notably, it is because of the challenge of 
unraveling “authorship” that courts have persistently rejected grafting an independent right of 
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Even if an attorney truly drafts alone, any claims to “originality” in legal writing 
remain highly suspect. The genius of the common law, of course, is that, to be 
sound, the analysis of any legal issue must be deeply informed by legal principles 
presented in earlier texts; i.e., written opinions. In this sense, then, an expectation 
of plagiarism is baked into the common law system. The work of any competent 
legal writer will, then, necessarily hew to the structure, grammar, and phrasing of 
earlier authors; i.e., the judges and their clerks that wrote the opinions upon which 
the legal writer relies (and whose writing, in turn, was surely informed by even more 
writers). Against this backdrop, it is a bit too much for any lawyer to claim that it is 
his children that are kidnapped when another lawyer plagiarizes.113 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, the prevailing rule against plagiarism in written practice cannot be 
justified. Competent plagiarism does not undermine the work of the courts. 
Plagiarism does not undermine the client’s interests; if anything, it obtains cost-
efficiencies on the client’s behalf. Finally, original authors have only the barest 
copyright interests that might be offended by a plagiarized brief, and the legitimacy 
of claims to a “moral” right to attribution fade deeply in modern legal practice. 
Collectively, the interests served by a rule against plagiarism simply prove too 
inconsequential to outweigh the efficiencies obtained by the practice. 
I recognize that an argument against an anti-plagiarism rule is an argument in 
favor of plagiarism. This is not a position I am particularly comfortable with. I am 
sympathetic to the notion that drafting a strong and persuasive argument is a work 
of creative art—it requires a linear logic elegantly woven through a narrative 
structure and a fluency of prose. Thus, I am deeply skeptical of the plagiarizing 
 
attribution into American copyright law. This is not to say that courts and state bars cannot enforce an 
anti-plagiarism rule to serve legitimate extra-legal professional values. But copyright law’s wisdom does 
offer counsel. American copyright law’s rejection of an independent right of attribution is not some 
accidental doctrine. An enforceable right of attribution is incorporated into the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the premier international agreement governing 
intellectual property rights. See Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of 
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49, 67-69 (2006). But the United States, despite being a signatory to the Berne 
Convention, has persistently rejected recognizing attribution rights. See Tushnet, supra note 43, at 787 
(reviewing omission of right of attribution in United States law). As David Nimmer explains, the 
enforcement challenges presented by the fluid nature of modern authorship would render an attribution 
regime “a cure worse than the disease.” Nimmer, supra note 30, at 65; see also Tushnet, supra note 43, at 
814 (concluding the administrative costs of affording attribution right under copyright law would 
outweigh the benefit to authors). 
113. See N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 14 (2009) (“By its nature, the application of the 
common law is all about precedent, which invites the re-use of arguments that have previously been 
successful and have been upheld. It would be virtually impossible to determine the origin of the legal 
arguments in many briefs.”); Nimmer, supra note 30, at 62 (suggesting that plagiarism “form[s] the 
backbone of litigation in the federal courts.”). The diffusion of authorship fostered by the common law 
is only exacerbated by modern practice which gives writers access vast searchable databases of other 
authors’ writings. See generally HOWARD, supra note 36, at 131–32 (“[E]lectronic composition is 
changing authorship by providing new models of and venues for collaboration and mimesis.”). 
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attorney—for copying another’s creative expression and taking credit for the work, 
but also for failing to pursue the craft “the right way.” Still, I am convinced that 
many Americans in need of legal representation simply cannot afford to subsidize 
an attorney’s original brief-writing. If plagiarism allows attorneys to provide cost-
effective legal services to these under-resourced Americans, then courts and 
professional tribunals should have no objection. 
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